**TO AFFIRM ART'S POTENTIAL FOR INTIMATE DIFFERENCE UNDER DIGITISATION: RE-GATHERING PERFORMING'S RELATION TO MEDIUM**

**Performing's Medium-Bond Loosened**

Under modernity the division of the arts according to performance-medium had been maintained and reinforced. This complemented the meeting of two regions of contemporary 'experiencing' (what we are held to and in by the 'modernising' that constitutes 'modernity') in which processes of sub-division and the allocation of identity were already 'at work' in the culture and indeed are still partially definitive of its continuing transformation.

Firstly, crucial to the emergence of industrialisation and its afterward, and structuring the range and quality of its relations, is a technically specialised division of labour that changes continually through the relations between the knowledges of techno-science and the control of production-consumption (the capital-state combine); 'work' is defined by its continual breakdown and reforming according to the specialised tasks required by an ever-renewed revolutionising of productive means. And, secondly, performing across 'the arts' follows and maintains this through its separation of the human sensorium broadly according to organ-specificity, a sub-division largely reinforced by the natural sciences endless break down of 'wholes' and assumed 'unities' into the structuring of their constituent 'elements' (each such element becoming in turn a 'new' 'whole' awaiting its eventual breakdown). As the 'whole' in question for both is 'embodied human becoming', for techno-science as object and for art as sourcing, the two have, until recently, paralleled each other in preserving organ-specificity as both the basis and the means for sub-division of their respective 'tasks' (for techno-science - the analytical-practical knowing-and-de-and-re-constitution of 'the body'in its 'environment', and for art - the felt-thought performance of a celebratory questioning of each 'sense's' possibilities, *as if it could and should be detached (art as a thought-and-feeling experiment of just such detachment) from its surrounding senses and kept alone, pure and separate).*

In art's case the authoritative institutional preservation of these sub-divisions occurs in spite of both the 'synaesthesia', to which I have already drawn attention, and the intense involvement of 'thinking' (that is of all the processes and constituents of thought in its inordinately complex combinations with 'feelings of' and 'feelings for' (occurring through rememoration, reverie, dreaming, attending-to, syncopating-leaping, language-play, touching and being-touched, conceptualisation, and so on and on...)) in and as the very course of performing. Further, it continues to set the conditions for performance and response, despite the multiple projects under modernity and its afterward that have reconvened performance, as noted earlier, around the combining of media, from Wagner's vision of the 'total art-work', through film's emergence as a possibly separable art-'medium' combining several media (including its subsequent technical complexification through video-tape, and digitisation's modes of coding and storing 'everything' readable- hearable-writable as 'information' for reproduction ), and through the multi-media events of dada and surrealism, to the apparent separation of 'performance' itself as an independent mode of making that can entail different media combinations. And it is in spite, too, of those sites of performing (theatre, opera, and dance most obviously) in which different media together are already recognised as constituting possible sites for art.

It seems, then, that whatever the institutional dominance of media-separation as the taken for granted condition for both performing and response, when specific projects have initiated the breakdown of barriers between media, performers have followed the project's call, its demand, and searched for the project-specific way of conjoining materials from different media. Such conjunctions, seemingly radically disjunctive in terms of conventional criteria for medium-specific performance, can only be accomplished through back-and-forth saltations that pass weightlessly (because no longer grounded by medium-specific requirements) over the seeming abysses between media. Committing themselves to affinities-within-difference, they stake everything on the possibility of complementarity, of establishing 'friendly' relations, precisely by trying to stay in-between, by committing to the join (perhaps even finding a potential 'promise' in its disjunctive qualities...) and not to a medium's singular 'authority'.

Such a performing-in-between thus already entails the suspension of some of the conventions upon which this authority has sought to ground itself, conventions which have supported, usually implicitly, a sense of 'tradition' to define a medium's parameters (including its criteria for valuing and judging). These largely 'unspoken' performance-traditions are precisely what get upheld and transmitted within those institutions responsible for the education, training, and judged induction of neophytes into performing's possibilities. They are difficult to change because they are translated into formal arrangements according to institutional interests (self-maintenance and the pedagogical norm of authority that sets the terms for the trainer-trainee relationship) having nothing to do with the plight of performing beyond these institutions' local controls. Moreover they work to confirm the founding 'reason' for such institutions under modernity – the maintenance of a productive division of labour to be developed through the practical application of discipline-specific knowledges to the technically specialised (and thus, eventually, infinitely sub-dividable) tasks of production. Calculative thought endlessly interrupts 'wholes/identities' through its analytical (but always with practical ends 'in mind'...) fracturing procedures that generate 'new' sub-specialisms, as every discipline-specific syllabus manifests. Maintained within this regime of institutional sponsorship and control the arts can no more escape its effects on their developed senses of their 'identity' and performance than any other 'discipline' (which leaves open, as intimated earlier, the question of whether 'the arts', each particular 'art', can, should, be constituted as 'a discipline' organised around its own discrete 'object of (de-created?) knowledge'...). Under the academy's rule each 'art' is effectively treated as just such a 'discipline' participating with other disciplines in a supposedly common project of technical-theoretical learning and its assessment.

Yet the culturally over-arching dynamic of techno-scientific research and development, through the terms of its continual ideational and machinic application to real life processes, now sets the terms on which 'representation' (and thus 'the arts' through their current indissoluble ties to 'representation') is routinely and globally accomplished; these are the terms through which we, all of us, are represented and represent ourselves. We live-on, sur-vive, on and within representation's terms - they are our 'condition'. Techno-science's calculative dynamic, through its confluence and identification with the processes of energy-extraction and -application, is continually re-forming, complexifying, the machinery through which representation 'works' (and thus, by extension, how all of us are put to work through it). As we live through these re-formings we experience them typically as slow and accumulative in their effects, but not necessarily as radical displacements or replacements of what representation 'is' (let alone as raising the question of whether representation 'is' some 'thing' whose 'truth' could be shown through other terms, terms that might somehow be able to claim independence from, externality to, representing 'itself' ... the very problem in which thinking-writing, including this here, is entrammelled...).

But perhaps it is in the interests of performing-for-art, whose own 'life' is absolutely entwined with representation, to consider whether we are now in the throes of a more seismic shift in its terms. Indeed, it may be that performing across the arts is already feeling its way around and about, and thus drawing attention towards, such a possibility. Precisely because its own possibility is the focus of its searchings, making-toward-art is particularly sensitive to such changes and the troubles (and possible delights) they raise for performing. If such a shift is already under way, as I am suggesting here, then performing is indeed already in the throes of responding to its consequences, but always on the terms of the institutions through whose social relations performing's life is played out. And institutions are notoriously slow to confront, re-think, and adapt to the implications of revolutionary technical change. For such change may impact on and have unforeseeable consequences for the quality of 'relating' itself, and thus, in the present case, for what it might be 'to relate' to something, to anything, by claiming to represent 'it'. In the contemporary context faced by performing, where 'relating' and 'representing' are routinely, and perhaps inseparably, intimately intertwined, it may be that this intimacy defines the terms of performing's possible 'life', the plight of its living-on. For, in such a circumstance, making-toward-art, *as a relating that seeks to leap away from representation*, finds itself snared in an unbearable tension.

Thus performing's medium-commitment, its seizure of and by either a single medium treated as separable and isolatable in principle from every other medium, or its conjoining of two or more media in a specific gest, in short, its relation to the performance-defining choice concerning specialisation and combination, would be the site of intense questioning activity and, possibly, change. It might well be that the established, institutionally signalled and controlled, conventions drawing performing to one medium, are in increasing conflict with performers' real experiences of the tensions of trying to make-for-art when the encasing culture's means of authoritative relating - the machinery of 'representation' - is itself undergoing profound change. For performing pursues its possibilities precisely by trying to open up and situate itself within a gap between 'relating' and 'representing'. Each performing occasion constitutes its space-time through the specificities it experiences as the marks of its unique relations in context.

Performers thus explore their embodied-becoming as the back and forth movement, the singular interplay, in between their sensual affinities for art's gests, their modes of remembering, their imaginative thought, and their unique attachments to context (to persons and places), as all these are disseminated in the conventions of current representation. Each gest emerges as the bearer of marks that hope to show the vitality and significance of these relations *once the effects of representation have been suspended*. And when the machinery of representation is itself rendered unstable through technical innovations then performers, acutely sensitive to what hems them in, begin to feel out other possibilities in their relations to 'medium', to what seems to 'bear' their marks. Their in-between experiencing, their contextual embodied-becoming, shows them that they relate to 'medium' not as some neutral vehicle, but rather as that potential for exposure which releases and holds the specific qualities they seek for their marking. Performing's marks are themselves re-constitutive of 'medium', of what the performer asks the transliterated material to carry. Under the sway of art, the draft towards Art's Body, performing loosens the conventions that seem to have fixed both the sense and the matter of what constitutes a 'medium' and makes it possible to reconvene 'medium' elsewhere… or rather, perhaps, to displace 'medium' from its defining role through inter-relating media in order to generate a gest whose 'point' and potential will not be determined by its position in relation to conventions about medium-specificity and -purity. Under these shifting terms of performing's attachments it can then leap forth toward a site where certain fusions and conjunctions can be

enacted in the hope of generating a gest-in-difference, an outcome that tries to extract possibilities from previous incompatibilities.

*'Medium' gives way to a multiple sense of marking that is prepared to scavenge and re-assemble, as a kind of reinvented collageing, whatever it needs to make its transliterated marks escape representation's binds and carry it some way toward that otherwise swarming.* 'Medium' treated as neutral carrier is itself displaced and transformed into a constituent moment and element of marking. It is not that it becomes 'the message' (after all art's gest carries no such message) but rather that, in what it enables, it 'writes' itself in between, behind and through performing's markings thus disposing a 'regioning' within which certain marks can come and go. What then goes on through this under-writing is a mode of conferring in which multiple marks generate possibilities (for sensuously thoughtful response) 'among themselves'. That which, as noun (medium), was treated as a separable 'thing' with an independent function (a kind of porter), now becomes intensely verb-like and integral to marking's life. It actively participates in a gest's emergence, continually provoking a performer into a 'dialogue' with it in the course of the marking and re-marking gestures. Emphasising this 'togetherness' (the 'con-' - the 'with' - of 'conferring'), 'medium' might be replaced by the present participle of '*conferre*' (to bring together into a mass, to gather) as performing's '*conferrens*', its co-respondent in getting the gest out. This resituates a performer's relation to the context of performing; the active 'speaking back' of the conferrens re-defines this relation itself as a mutual venture in the suspension of representation. Relating itself is reconvened elsewhere with consequences for the subsequent relations to the gest of the respondents-to-come.

Perhaps, too, in relation to performing's perennial crisis condition, its current cultural plight, any significant change in the character and 'means' of, and thus the terms on which we relate to, representation, has far-reaching implications for the real everyday 'life' of language and languaging, the very processes through which performers-to-be come to performing in the 'first place'. And, given the centrality of institutional 'life' to the routine shaping and development of what making-for-art is 'taken to be' or 'looks like', such change will impact on the institutionally managed and directed conventions that impact on a performer's involvement with the conferrens. As implied above, the self-interest and relative inertia that characterise everyday institutional life will invariably result in attempts to hold onto existing organisational solutions and arrangements until the pressures to change can be resisted no longer. The primacy of each potential maker's conferrens-commitment, the quality of their singular relation to performing, is in direct tension with each institution's need to treat its 'products' (trainee-performers) *en masse*. For the institution, trainees are members of a class who are being processed (measured up and classified) according to their typicality and whose idiosyncratic qualities have to be collapsed into and accommodated in existing institutional categories. In an institutional context 'medium' is thus, first and last, an institutional category; it is bound to wider issues of programme-delivery and -servicing. Even though elsewhere (the studio, alternative display sites) it may be being burst asunder.

During the period of modernity's persistent retreat and scattering there are many displays of such an elsewhere-bursting. Could it be that the same techno-science whose rule produces the dynamic of specialisation itself and the continual sub-division of tasks, is effecting changes in the 'machine' of representation that, paradoxically, in the case of making-for-art, divert the pressures away from specialisation into a much looser and more open relation with performing's boundaries and its conferrens-commitment? Indeed it may be that performing is being challenged to re-site itself right there at the thresholds between boundaries in order to explore the consequences and possibilities for it of a boundary-dissolution or -decay arising in an

elsewhere quite other to the performing situation. In 'To Perform' the containing context of this boundary blurring was explored through a consideration of the emergence of a 'consumptive aesthetics' that, texturing everyday life and binding it to consumption, works its way out as the now globally programmed provision of info-tainment. The mutating phantasmagoria of its 'products', material-ideational hybrids, are delivered electronically via a constantly evolving array of telematic machinery. Subsequently I noted that this transition in the relation between 'culture' and 'representation' (even, perhaps, their eliding in which 'culture' becomes 'whatever-representation') was being accomplished through the now routine substitution of digital for analogue technology.[1]

Whereas the arts under modernity had continued as the interplay of separable media, seemingly aside from any overarching media-integrating 'medium', the culture industry's appropriation and gathering of media forced the question of 'medium' itself onto the agenda of those seeking to make-toward-art. For their own 'media differences' were being subsumed by a representing machinery that appeared to collapse 'medium' into the means of representation that it owned and managed. The significance of 'medium' for the arts was both highlighted and transformed in the course of the emergence of a technologically-dependent, multi-media programmed popular culture, a culture designed for mass audience-reception through various combinations of 'seeing' and 'hearing'. This culture of a nascent but rapidly generalisable aestheticised consumption, framed by both state control (legislative and financial) and private capital, required an army of producers for its multiple technical functions and a complementary open-ended supply of persuadable consumer-respondents for its audiences. The arts, by definition already performing in close media-proximity to this programming complex, were drawn unavoidably into its play as both subjects and as ambivalent participants. For it was clear that the politico-economic struggle over both what was to 'count' as a 'valued' medium and the terms of such 'value' were being played-out within that technoscientifically developed complex whose ever more explicit goal was the representation of everything. And, to ensure its recognition as the arbiter of representation, it needed to demonstrate that it had every language realm and medium in its grasp; it had to display as a routine feature of its everyday work that, in its overarching span, it had every such medium under its control. And perhaps the supreme but unspoken challenge was to show that making-toward-art and its gests could be gathered up into representation's folds alongside everything else. For, *as the hoped-for beyond of representation, that whose very mode of becoming requires it to suspend representation in order to offer and show, through the defining singularity of its gests, the difference of its elsewhere, art appears, sets itself forth, as representation's supreme target.*

But in its very mode of appearance, the proneness of its abjection, art makes representation's task of absorption and control seemingly straightforward. Under representation's interests and technically developed procedures this straightforwardness, recalling the derivation of 'prose', is defined by the unremittingly prosaic quality of its programmed relation to the entirety of its routine languaging work. The machinery of representation sustains and renews its cultural programming precisely through its technical mastery of and reliance on the modes of prose it develops to turn the input and output of its apparatus (the real hardware that comprises its battery of recording/imaging/disseminating machines together with the social machinery that operationalises these) into 'commonsense'. In its prosaic rhetorical inflections

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[1] See the relevant discussion in 'To Mobilise for Dislocation' and especially the sub-section 'Performing Under Aestheticising Representation's Technical Rule' (p. 335).

(persuasive seduction by life-aestheticisation) of the latter it represents (as a standing-in-for, a speaking-writing-imaging-on-behalf-of) everything that appears (to be the case...), *including, and especially, art*. Art now appears for us, prosaically, as that which is sensibly constructed in the multiple 'tellings', the grand and minuscule narratives and stories through which the representing machinery distributes culture and persuades us that it has the authority to do so. Through these 'tellings' art's singularities are shown as that which can be made 'meaningful' and thus returned, from the solitude of performing's desert, to everyday life as it is now lived-through, appropriately re-housed in the routine typicalities of everyday (technically tuned) reasoning. This is the world of globally circulating representation that now contains making-toward-art and its gests, thus shaping their plight and challenging all the tradition-defined conceptions of 'medium' that even the precedent moderns had largely taken as matters for development, rather than revolutionary transformation.

### Making-For-Art Takes on Digitisation's Scattering of Representation's Motivated Relations

In this transition it is the seismic shift in representation itself, its 'what' and 'how', that begins to undo 'culture' as we have known and 'represented' it and to bear it somewhere else. And it may be precisely here, in this shift away from analogy to digital substitution, that medium specificity is being burst asunder, taken elsewhere. Indeed, the sculptor/performer Robert Morris, emphasising the intertwining of image and reading through digitisation, argues that,

> 'It is no accident that the demise of modernism coincides with the ascendancy of a digital system of 'reading' images, which has surely also reordered aesthetic responses. Today everything is scanned or "read".'[2]

This challenge to medium specificity is pointed to by Sadie Plant in her exploration of the effects of digitisation on the relation between women and machines. In the context of a discussion of the implications of the emergence of quantum computing (the incompatibility of particle behaviour at the quantum level - seemingly instantaneous entanglement and mutual changing at a distance - with the machine model on which conventional computing has so far been based) she makes this point about digitisation's implications for medium-specificity:

> 'Machine code has been enough to allow sound, images, calculations, and texts to interact on an unprecedented plane of equivalence and mutual consistency. What were once discrete media and separable senses have become promiscuous and entwined. New modes of communication, even little bits of other senses, have already emerged from the multimedia, multisensory interactions digitization has provoked.'[3]

What we have taken 'sensing' to be, together with the relations between supposedly separate senses, are being re-opened as questions at the level of 'experience', quite practically, precisely at the interface between human subjectivity and electronic machines. Caught up, like everything else, in this simultaneously metaphysical but very real, and extraordinarily complex, re-forming of the relation between represender and represented, making-for-art finds that its own challenge and question (its perennial crisis as the crisis of how to relate to representation and to its ways with languaging) seem to coincide with this transformation. In taking on, confronting, its own edges and limits (as it is obligated to do), it finds itself adrift between the already dissolving

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[2] Robert Morris, op. cit., p. 196.
[3] Sadie Plant, 'zeros and ones', Fourth Estate, London, 1998, p. 255.

boundaries of media whose own frames and identities are being broken up and redistributed. It is not, of course, that particular media are disappearing (although such is always possible...) but rather that, as new hybrid media emerge under digitisation's rule, the relations and thus the boundaries between media are rendered both fragile and problematic.

The implications for making-for-art of this revolution in the technical processes, through which representation occurs as a 'public' (and thus absolutely socio-political), era-defining, 'matter' (by now as a 'matter-of-course'), cannot but be revolutionary. And, as a revolution without precedent, its implications are both unknowable and disastrous. For it confronts performing with a disaster defined by its ungraspability (dis-aster – there is simply no star-light *independent of the combustion- derived electronic light enabling and structuring the flows of digitisation itself* that can light a way through...). As that which is 'happening' (without ever taking place because it is the undoing of place-as-specificity) to performing's possibility, to the terms on which it can 'come about' – how it imagines and composes almost-languaged figurings of itself, of ourselves, and our relations to ourselves, our circumstances, and languaging itself - its implications can only be 'felt out' in the singularity of each performance. For it is in this singularity that each performer confronts their in-volvement (whose 'volv' is affined with the 'turning' performed in revolution's 'volu') with the real materials and circumstances that situate performing's plight. Disaster's placelessness, its absolute elusiveness, can only ever be experienced, taken on, under the particular circumstances of becoming (performing) in a certain place, in the 'right here, right now' of the 'given' moment (recalling and affirming yet again Celan's 'all our dates'...). And this very specificity is precisely what defines performing, what it seeks to celebrate in and as whatever its gest can expose of its 'own' plight... even though this exposure may be no more (and certainly no less) than the feeling out of a 'Saying' whose clarity (and thus its strange delight) exposes the complexity of what John Ashbery, writing of Henri Michaux, calls 'the fluctuating anguish of day-to-day, minute-to-minute living'.[4]

The absolute dependence of techno-representation's now fully operational hybridising machinery on the continuous supply of electronically controlled and distributed power (the continuing legacy of the 'combustion' whose pathos is memorialised by Sebald) has already been emphasised. But it is at the point of 'delivery', the sites of its reception for both performing and responding, that its possibly revolutionary implications are being experienced. For that is where the power (in all its forms) supplied is mediated by, and thus re-formed by and in the process of digitisation. And, as this process is being adapted to become the dominant operation in every sub-sphere of representation, everywhere where a 'medium' can operate as the carrier of a 'content' made up of 'representations' (the 'message' in the form of 'information'), then making-for-art, through its attempts to 'dwell' in specific media already under the sway of this process, finds itself absorbed and sent on its way by it. And in relation to the machinery and processes of power, Debord makes the crucial point regarding this flow of images and information that 'it is someone else who controls at will this simplified summary of the sensible world'. He suggests that the general acceptance of this flow manifests the 'concrete experience of permanent submission'. Indeed 'the computer's binary language is an irresistible inducement to the continual and unreserved acceptance of what has been programmed according to the wishes of someone else and passes for the timeless source of a superior, impartial and total logic'.[5]

[4] John Ashbery, 'Reported Sightings', Harvard University, Cambridge (Mass.), 1991, p. 396.
[5] Guy Debord, op. cit., p. 28 – 29.

The question that performing is thus confronted with, irrespective of its chosen medium/media, is whether the Body of Art that it is making for (over there...) is and always has been .... *nothing but representation right here*, no more and no less than the Body of representation (the technical-social machinery that embodies representation), the Body that represents representation, thus reminding us that there is nothing beyond itself, nothing that is not representable: do the gests gathered as 'art' comprise a sub-species of, a 'class' within, an all-encompassing category of 'representation' that has itself been assimilated to and is now equated with 'information'? Is art caught up in a spiralling circling performance of representation? Are art's gests all, fundamentally in their ontological constitution (their embodied-becoming), 'representations', and now, therefore, available as, in the same form as, 'information'? Are they, in other words, re-presentings of past presences, reproductions in knowable clear languages of 'something' outside and preceding themselves that has already 'occurred', where this 'something' can include, of course, a performer's 'experiences' in the course of a gest's precedent performance? Is a poem or a novel a 're-presentation' of the felt-thoughts of its writer during the 'time' of its writing? Is a musical group's performance of a composer's score a re-presentation of the latter, and is the latter in its turn a re-presentation of the composer's composing experience? And so on... For if they are such re-presentations then the difference between art's gests and any other 'class' of re-presentations would turn on whether there was something unique in the relations between the re-presenter (gest) and the 'origin' being re-presented that differentiated art gests, in principle, from all other representations. And indeed much of the history of the textual and discursive response to the arts' gests, certainly in the emergence of the discourses of philosophy, of aesthetics, of art histories, of cultural analysis, and of 'critique', has been taken up with the conceptualisation of just such supposed relations and their differences.

Much of this analytical-historical-evaluative work has been carried out in the shadow of senses of mimesis, of the art gest as the display of some kind of near-or-far form of imitation; performing - treated as representation - is taken to be in some way an attempt to reproduce aspects of the re-presented under the rule of some kind of copying or miming process characterised by the attempt to produce a 'likeness'. This is the context in which 'analogy', as a way of generalising and opening out the work of mimesis that attaches it to 'being-like', becomes a common resource. The emergent gest is taken to be re-productive, an analogous re-animation or re-forming, in medium-specific terms of some precedent (event(s)) to which the performing and its emergent gest is a creative but belated (always after-the-event - via the 're-') response, the creativity being invested in establishing the credentials for a claim to 'likeness': the recovery by supposed resemblance of a now lost, disappeared, 'present'.

Aspects of mimesis have been considered earlier in the context of the introduction of transliteration and the leaps entailed in converting 'experiences' into something-'like'-a-language (through a 'like' perhaps to one side of resemblance ... but where exactly?). But the question at issue here concerns the possible way that digitisation (of re-presenting across all media) impacts on all formulations of the relation between a gest and its possible sourcing, and in particular on those offering the relation as, at whatever level, analogical comparison, *as a referring-back-to by likeness* (watered down mimesis). Where this relation is conceptualised as one of representation by an analogy that binds the re-presenter to the re-presented (and where the very conceptualisation itself represents itself, explicitly or tacitly, as a further 'moment' of representation) the implications for such discourse may be shattering. For digitisation seems to overturn the conventions that have been developed for 'making sense' of and 'fixing' this relation. In other words it may entail a re-framing, and thus a re-figuring, of how this relation

(and thus the relation between 'art' and 'culture', between 'art' and 'everything else') is set up and sent on its way, is, in short, re-presented.

The figure through which digitisation is given a relation to language and experience, and thence is operationalised, is one that might initially appear to make it subservient to some encompassing sense of language, that of 'the code' and 'coding'. But, in practice, it operates rather as a suspension, a displacement, of language as we 'know' it in both commonsense and analytical usage. Coding is put to work as a process that operates independently of what we think of as 'language'. For the development of a way of converting such language-in-use into 'machine-readable' form, that is, into 'information' (artificial intelligence), required a response that adapted it to the real conditions of the machinery by which power is transmitted and controlled. It had to be fitted to electronics in the most efficient way possible, to ensure that the maximum quantity of information was transmitted at the least cost, least effort - the parsimony rule of techno-capitalism's instrumental rationality. Gaddis, as noted earlier in relation to his history of the player piano's disjunctive relation to art, had already shown the long (relatively...) history of this development, from the emergence of mechanical toys, through the Jaquard loom and Babbage's 'Difference Engine', to the electronic computer itself. And Plant extends this development and turns it through questions of gender in her exploration of Lovelace's contribution.

The 'point' of the drive towards computing was to generate a set of instructions for converting anything that could be turned into bits of information into a code that would be machine-readable. It entailed a complementary two-stage process of a breaking down of the source material into equal appearing bits, and an adaptation of the processing, the sequencing, of these bits to the way the machine structured the possibilities of the flow of electronic power. Programming became the conversion process for transforming whatever-source-material into a sequence of coded instructions for the machine operation, its sequential 'reading' as a following of these instructions. And the parsimony rule for the energy required for this processing was solved by reducing the machined operation of 'the code', through which every 'thing' that was to be carried (represented) as a bit of information, to two digits - 0 and 1. These were to be the prime signals of the code that enabled the machine to respond to its programmed instructions through a sequence of electronically charged alternations between 0 and 1, between 'if-this' then 'not-that'. All source material, everything with information-potential (which for techno-science now coincides with everything knowable (that is re-constitutable as an appearance) to its methods, all its 'objects of knowledge'), was to be broken down into constituent elements of equal value whose presence-absence (1 or 0) at each juncture in the sequence of information was the signal for the alternation of the electric current. And with micro-processing's use of materials with high compaction and very low interference, transmission of the coded information could occur according to the controlled release of electricity's exorbitant speed, now measured in nano-seconds. Irrespective of source, once programming had devised means for converting medium-specific matter into alternating signals that could be allied with tele-technology, the resulting 'information' became the means, 'available' seemingly in 'no time at all', for 'instant' global transmission and exchange. Every such converted mode and medium of 'communication' (the transmission of the senses and sensations of everyday life, with the possible exceptions (so far...) of smell, taste, and the haptic, is treated as a 'language' that is reducible to and reproducible as an electronically driven 'code'. This is constituted by the language's converted 'elements' that have been sub-divided into informationally 'equal' and 'neutral' bits.

For techno-science, and thus for the culture now reliant on the global production and exchange of information-as-means, the awesome advantage of 'the code' (as means by which computation 'works') is its transferability. It enables analytical-computational work to procede irrespective of the differences in source materials. The 'natural', the 'human', the 'social', the 'linguistic', the 'sensuous', and all the analytically separable processes through which techno-scientific discourses sub-divide these fields of 'research', are homogenised, brought under the same transforming rule through the code's operational process. In its very operation it makes an implicit claim, if not quite about the 'nature of every thing', then at least about the 'nature of all the objects of technoscientific knowledge' (and this would include the knowledges of everyday life where that culture is lived under technoscience's rule). Every thing operates (or rather, perhaps, we make operational sense of it...), becomes what it is, according to a code that forms it. And every informational bit through which that code is operationalised, as a quantum of information registerable through a charged machine, is equal to and analytically no different from, the bits of information constituting all other objects of knowledge. Formally, the machined signals that show the sub-divisions of the dna code (life-means as coded differences) are the same in principle as the bar code on the cereal packet or the coded alternations that allow words to appear on the computer screen (to light up or not to light up) irrespective of their 'source' in events aside from the computer keyboard.

This substitution of one 'thing' for another still seems to offer itself as a mode of representation, but in this substitution it is the latter as we have known and continue to use it which is undone. Conversion into machine-readable code scatters all those senses of the relation between a sign (whatever-phonic-graphic-'mark/s' in whatever-combination) and its referent that seek to show its representing work as *grounded in some form of 'motivated' and 'direct' form of linking alliance*. It appears to be the final(?) step in the separation, made explicit by de Saussure, of the 'signifier' from the 'signified'. This substitution of an instructional sequence of digitally ordered alternations for the sign-referent relation disposes of all other terms used to account for such relations, whatever the motivating convention employed, whether sameness-mimesis, likeness-analogy, coherence, correspondence, affinity, some-thing-in-commonness, or anything else. At a stroke of the pre-programmed keyboard key the commonsense and analytical conventions of connection via likeness, *of what allows a relation to subsist, what 'holds' two or more different modes of becoming together, are severed absolutely*. All that remains of relation to some 'real', and thus of representation, is an entirely virtual consistency that 'occurs' only in the 'no time at all' (the computer's inexperienceable speeds simply passing us by...) of the electronically programmed alternating between presence and absence. Virtuality and simulation, sufficient unto themselves, are the afterwards of relation; they seem to set up 'the same' only everso slightly differently in an elsewhere that is quite aside from all that 'likeness' and 'resemblance', everything that our thoughtful sensorium 'tells' us places one thing in some relation of affinity (partial sameness, some kind of overlap, metonymic connection) with another. *They offer us an elsewhere that is neither here nor there.*

It seems, then, that digitisation's promiscuity with respect to medium-specificity, its taking on and gathering whatever-media to its homogenising conversion process, threatens making-toward-art's commitment to search for and show, in and as its gests, its difference to all other ways of performing a relation to self and world. For, if performing sites itself, or is sited by others, within the conversion process, if it accepts the terms on which languages and media are collapsed into information through programming and electronically controlled instructions, then its relations to its 'materials' are already formed elsewhere according to techno-science's instrumental requirements. But art's possibility, its chance of self-differentiation from all other culturally positioned processes, has always rested on and been made manifest through

performing's attempts, each time necessarily differently, to disclose the singularity of its situated relations. And the defining relation around which all others revolve is that of each performer to the real material qualities of the  medium or media which performing engages on each of its occasions. The 'chosen' medium or media-combine that simultaneously 'chose' them  – that which could not be avoided as the way to leap away towards Art's Body  - is that through which each performer seeks to explore the other situation-defining relations. Medium has been taken as that which allows the constitution, via the meridian followed through life-circumstances, of a singular gest, a one-off out-figuring of the performer's  relation simultaneously to both art (over there) and world (right here). Yet under digitisation it seems to be precisely this singularity and circumstantial specificity that is being swept up by and into a completely different forming process, *a  mode that undoes relating 'itself' by excising the terms on which relations have been claimed in both art and everyday life*  - the attachment by  some kind of affinity (partial overlap, some becoming-in-common) to others (a synaesthesic complex of ties to things, persons, processes, and, for art, otherness 'itself'  - its 'over-there-beyond').

If digitisation has become the now global conversion process through which 'languages' across all media are turned into a common code, then it becomes the shared but groundless ground where the terms for relating and for everything we include in 'sense' and 'sensing', in 'languaging' itself,  are set out.  All surfacing 'appearances' are taken to be the products of the activity of the code 'at work' 'behind', 'within', 'underneath' whatever-surface. They seem to be doing the work of representing, keeping it going, but, as already hinted, this may be our 'illusion'. And this code, in its programmed virtuality, as precisely a coding process that operates aside from the specificity of a medium (with the defining exceptions of the electric current or 'the wave-band' as media) or media-combine, and thus as the confounding of such specificity, becomes both source and means for all media. While being without substance itself, being no more nor less than a linking of electronic alternations, it operates a kind of absolute reduction (this 'absolute' is always relative, always 'for the time being'). For it collapses the distinction between a  medium and its supposed content, and thus between ends and means. In the digitised coding there is no seemingly separable vehicle (medium) which houses something that is being carried (trans-ferred) independently of its housing. *There is  only the transmission of alternation*, of transmitting as alternation, the passing along, through and away of switching  - on-off, presence-absence, light-dark  - what goes on *in the absolute gap* 'between' 0 (and) 1. Everything seems to  'occur' at, within, and through the 'and',  this little conjunction-as-hyphen, that is put to work to relate 0 **and** 1. For it appears to surface as a holding operation for keeping things (here the most reduced 'things' that have displaced all other things  -  0 and 1) apart-and-together... conjunction-disjunction . Except that the hyphen, the 'and',  has no referent. The hyphen's appearance performs the essential cover-up. For what it hides is that there is nothing behind or within, only the vacancy of a passing away, the dying charge.

Perhaps this passing through and away of charging is, for our time being, the closest we can get to the infinitely distant 'calculation' that  the routine practices of techno-science, in their all-too-close and forceful entry into everything that matters (our shared terrestrial becoming), materially 'embody' and enact. For  the current electronically dependent 'form' of 'existing-as-reckoning' (our absolute reliance on a calculative thought grounded in nothing but its own operations), through which 'calculation' makes its presence felt, is precisely that which we post-pleistocenian legatees are challenged  to find ways of sur-viving.  And it is certainly what making-toward-art tries to come to terms with in its de-creative search for ways of turning back through and out of, of out-performing,  its own inescapable immersion along with everyone else in such dead-reckoning work.  For performers already recognise (they have been forced to find out the hard way) that they are now condemned to trying to perform within the in-between, to

make their 'own' in-between between the culture that saturates them and the absolute other of art over there. They know, for it is the moderns' legacy, that there is no principled ground, outside their own yearning commitment to otherness, on which their performing can stand. So they have to perform, to try to make their gests make-for-art, in this in-between that is not an identifiable 'somewhere', that is neither 'home' nor absolutely 'alien', for it has to search out and expose its response to and to partake of both, of both calculation and estrangement.

Performing's in-between is this conjunctive-disjunctive immersed estrangement. It has to confront representation's displacement by digitisation, whilst being surrounded on all sides by its seeming routine continuance and apparently trouble-free accomplishment in the 'as if nothing has happened' of the info-spectacle's labyrinthine machinery. For that machinery's first task, what it is 'for', is to try to ensure that it is taken, received by its welcoming respondents (audiences), as the maintenance (business-as-usual) of the very representation it has disposed of. It seeks to show unequivocally that all its surfacings are still outcomes of a transmission process defined by a relation between a medium and a content which, though shaped by the medium, is finally independent of it. The framing, selecting, and shaping-forming specific to the particular medium are 'represented' (and largely received) as incidental rather than constitutive. A medium (the represener) is shown as the faithful bearer of a separable content (the past-presents now represented) whose 'life' outside the representation is in some motivated, and thus 'tied', 'close' relation (mimetic/analogical/ coherential/causal or whatever) to its 'medium-specific life'.

Perhaps, then, the machinery of extreme representation's supreme accomplishment to date is its routine practice of the boldest of sleights-of-machine. It is achieved through its extremely successful persuasion that, in the operations of its now digitised constituting and transmitting machinery, nothing has changed. Through the smoothness of its transitions and the apparent closeness of its surfaces to those that they have displaced, it reinforces receivers' sense of 'same as before only better' ('high definition t.v.'...). It is brilliant at maintaining the ordinary 'life' of representation (the seemingly motivated/'caused' relation of attachment of a referent to its languaged bearer) as a 'progressive' linear development of 'the same process' that is now being rendered through ever-more technologically complex and faster (usually) means. *Extreme representation is the maintenance of apparent representation through other means.*

The challenge performing thus has to take on, through its enforced participation (for that is where all performing has to begin – *in the midst*) in the calculative displacement of representation, is how to set down gests that, in exposing the tensions of living-in- between, point simultaneously to the possibility of a way, of ways, out, of getting on the way toward art. For art (performing being 'at it' in its 'not-quite-here') is where the 'otherwise-to-'what-is'' is offered. It cannot fully 'become' here, for right here is where art is routinely hybridised and packaged (represented under 'consumptive aesthetics') as art-lite. And what we think of as the gathering (for each performer slightly different) of this otherwise, Art's Body over-there as the swarming of a loose collection of gests, has been assembled largely as and with gests that display the 'authority' of performers' attachments to medium-specificity. At the least, such gatherings, always tied to a performer's idiosyncratic tracing of affections, have tended to give primacy to the sensuous attachment to a medium or media-combine. Thus what performing might now have to explore, entirely on its own terms (its hope for and commitment to making for art's 'beyond' through performing differently), are the consequences for these terms of techno-science's operational disposal of the medium-referent relation through which we have routinely lived under representation's rule.

If the maintenance of representation has now become the subterfuge of a digitised machinery of information-transmission that has operationally, that is for all practical purposes, displaced the representing relation, then performing is left, with its medium-attachments, in an unprecedented gap. Perhaps this emerging in-between is beginning to define the shape of its current destiny-as-plight. For it now seems to be adrift between a culture that continues to hold to representation as it was (but now as a Janus-faced machinery that maintains the illusion of representation while scattering the very relation - the motivated attachment - that constitutes representation itself), and the legacy of an otherwise-tradition that celebrates the sensuous attachment to medium-specificity. Perhaps it is this very attachment that offers ways of approaching performing's post-digitised plight.

**Performing's Intimate Relations**
Throughout the preceding discussions of this plight the insistent and recurrent question has been that of art's difference, of making-for-art as a performing toward a gest that would expose itself in and as its differentiation from all other possible modes of 'living' through, of taking on, 'the everydayness' of all our becoming. I have reiterated from a variety of sites and interests that, for performers, each gest's 'point' is to manifest this difference through its display of a sensuously thoughtful dual attachment: firstly to art's beyond as offered in others' preceding gests, and secondly to their own possibilities of sharing in something of this beyond through their exploratory immersion in a singular, context-bound and -responsive, and gathering-together (the conferrens...) making- project. The hope is that the resulting gest, as the residue of performing's leap away, will retain and disclose something of the leaping towards art's otherwise. Performing's dual attachment has thus been crucial to the issue to which I have constantly returned in the preceding discussions - the question of art's difference from all other modes of performing and projecting.

Always at issue is the intimacy of the relation between art's possible difference and the qualities of performers' gathering-attachment as disclosed in singular gests. But somehow performing has to fuse, this is its task, the two attachments into a singularity that is the not-quite-language of the gest. Each occasion of performing attempts to show that its chance of setting up the possibility of a relation to, perhaps a dialogue with, Art's Body (over there), is dependent upon the idiosyncratic 'closeness' of its relation to, its life within, its chosen gathered material combination. The two intimacies to Art's Body and to the conferrens - combined-matterings - have to be elided as the gest's singularity. And if elision, the seeming to become-at-one with each other, is the stake, then *perhaps it is intimacy itself that names what making-toward-art seeks: that closeness made possible through the quest for the inmost ('intimus' (Lat.) – inmost)*. Performing puts its question to that which is most within but which can only be released (transliterated) through its involvement with a co-gathering. It seeks to show this being-sourced through the only way it can, through its partnership, its near-fusion, with those materials it is most intimate with, in a relation to that which has been conventionally gathered and represented as a medium. Such intimacy is the condition for its quest to set forth its relation to art.

What it hopes to receive in response to its questioning are, recalling Wordsworth's showing, intimations from the unplaceable sourcing, hints of what, unbeknownst to it before these intimations, are intrinsic to it - the closest of the close. And any transliterative turning of such intimations into a gest that sets them forth, that exposes them, *turns the essential solitude of performing into an intimating*, an announcing that, in making the inmost's hints just about

(because still possibly recondite...) public, is on the way to language through its mattering-specificity. The hints are given a paradoxical matter-of-fact solidity through their material appearance in something-like-a-language while, in their not-yet 'state', seeking to withhold themselves from all attempts to frame and appropriate them as, after all now just another explicit language. Hence, the disquiet they provoke by seeming to be both within and outside culture, simultaneously right there, present to us, and somewhere else altogether, absent. In the publicity of their intimating they seem to display their desire for intimacy with the culture, while  the singularity of their idiosyncratic not-yet-language  withholds  this intimacy and instead seeks to expose its  leap towards a hoped-for intimacy with the beyond of art. And is not this intimacy tied to the singularity of each gest as its very point? Discussing Celan's remark that 'The poem is alone' Lacoue-Labarthe writes that '"alone" is a word that says singularity… a poem is only effectively a poem insofar as it is absolutely singular.'[6]

But, however ambivalent this double movement may appear, the engagement with intimacy, with the sourcing that is performing's inmost[7], confronts us with the elusive question of how, given a certain closeness,  a proximity of  one to an other, some movement  has to occur to effect a connection between them.  Indeed this draws us into the play and  possibility of 'relation' itself,  of the 'movement' that all relating requires  -  how a 'one', a 'subject',  is carried back, borne across, and connected to an 'other'. Perhaps, too, such a being-carried entails a leaping,[8] a casting and being cast of  a 'one' toward an 'other', and nowhere more so than in performing's venturing 'back' into  a sourcing. Lacoue-Labarthe opens onto such a region where relating, dialogue, and a poem's emergence turn around intimacy and what a poem might intimate about this emergence.

He offers  his explorations of Celan's poetry and  'Meridian' essay as openings onto the question of 'experience'. Through probing readings of several of Celan's poems he offers the poem (that is, poetising as performance) as 'translation', thus coming very close to what I have earlier explored through transliteration. The idiomatic poem translates 'experience', but it is ex-perience understood in its 'strict sense  -  the Latin *ex-pereri*, as a 'crossing through danger' - rather than in its conventional sense as the 'stuff of anecdotes'.[9]  He proposes that thought itself 'originates in intimacy as the possibility of *relating to* in general. It is in this sense that the poem thinks or is a dialogue.'[10]  The poem becomes an address to the (an) other in which the performer  (necessarily a listener-writer) lets 'what speaks in him or it occur'. It is to 'accept this word in the very heart of the poem ... as the gift of the other. It is to prepare, ecstatically, for the "presence" of the other within oneself; to let intimacy open up.'[11] The poem thus becomes the 'place', that is not 'anyplace', where intimacy occurs as dialogue without ever going outside itself, except in its necessary plunge through art into language and through language into art. As the 'inhuman essence' of man[12], language lets the poem show its, and art's, abyss. It is the 'brutal revelation' of an 'intimate gaping' for it is a 'pure spacing' with 'no hold'.[13] The inmost from which the poem is turned out is thus a disquieting elusive spacing that is simultaneously the possibility of relating (and thus dialogue) and a zone of groundless estrangeing.

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[6] P. Lacoue-Labarthe, 'Poetry as Experience', Stanford University, Stanford, 1999, p. 43.
[7] We have already seen the complexity of the debate around 'sourcing', specifically in relation to sexual difference and the mother as source, in the earlier discussion of Irigaray's writing.
[8] For elaboration of the relation between making-for-art and 'leaping' see my text 'To Leap'.
[9] P. Lacoue-Labarthe, op. cit., p.18.
[10] Op. cit.,  p. 64.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Op. cit., p. 96.
[13] Op. cit., p. 54.

Perhaps, then, it is intimacy, approached as this abyssal gaping whose closeness opens the possibility of relating, of an encounter, that can draw us into the unique and entangled tensions of performing's emergent relations with digitisation's scattering of representation. For, strangely, the revolutionary change entailed in this scattering seems to bring the operational effects of its machinery into a much 'closer' proximity (a proximity which may not yet generate a relation, a reciprocal movement entailing some kind of common sharing) with making-toward-art than could possibly have been anticipated from its techno-scientific sourcing.

Throughout I have made making-toward-art's differentiation the key question confronted by performing. The entire thrust of performing is to offer gests whose possibility rests in their difference from all other modes of showing, figuring, signing, languaging, 'meaning', 'sensing', telling, reporting, documenting ... in short all those modes now gathered under 'representing'. Unless it can expose moment-spaces, however briefly, of becoming-other-than as art's 'way' then, as art, it is nothing. All gests are, of course, appropriated by culture's aestheticising machinery. But those whose leaps have opened up a hole, however small its intimate gaping, in representation's sealing languages, live-on in and as the tension that this breaching generates. They persist in their in-between. Those gests whose leaps remain caught up in representation's folds either disappear or are absorbed by modes of representing that put them to work as routine members of the aestheticising machine. They are turned out as typifications re-enacting the conventions sustaining the culture's everyday 'aesthetic' according to interests that have nothing to do with art-as-beyond. Performers know this is performing's fate. And yet they continue to risk themselves to the outside chance that now and again, though absolutely unanticipatable, some gests will manage to make the breach, disclose the tension, and survive in a suspended leaping away that gestures beyond towards art's distant absence. Something charges them to keep trying to leap, something having nothing to do with aesthetics (the entire machinery of response) that 'begins' in an utterly different sourcing. The possibility of art's difference, the chance of participating in its exposure, and thus its fragile uncertain renewal, is the hope for what is not-yet that is part of this other-sourcing.

From within the site that performing tries to establish to effect its leap out, this making project knows very deeply - this is its defining know-how way beyond anything containable as 'knowledge' - that the outside possibility of its hoped-for difference will depend absolutely upon an unassailable sensually and thoughtfully over-flowing involvement with its materials. This involving is much more than an attachment - it is an immersion and a becoming-permeated-by. It is an intimacy from within in the strongest sense of intimacy - the inmost. *Whatever its materials, it wants to get to, to search out its way through, and however briefly to dwell in, their inmost*. It knows that nothing less than its thoughtful abandonment to those materials in which art's difference might just be exposed will do. And performers know that materials select them as much as they select materials. In this fused selection it is the 'giving-one's-self-up-to' the materials' specificity that takes us back to the emergence and still vital relevance of the moderns' vision. It reminds us of the critical quality of Rimbaud's 'reasoned deranging of all the senses' in sourcing art's possibility. Indeed Charles Olson proposes that, for performing's movement,

> 'Rimbaud's question is the incisive one – "What is on the other
> side of despair?" there is nowhere else to go but in and through.'[14]

Rimbaud's complementary question is the incisive one for performing's movement. For the intimacy of the 'giving-up-to', the interplay between playing-with and being-played-by the materials (as what absorbs, saturates, a performer's thinking-tissues, these materials are always

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[14] Chalres Olson, op. cit., p. 117.

far more than just elements of a carrying container, a medium acting as a conduit, for 'things' outside itself[15]), is the condition for the leap and the possible suspension of containment within everydayness. It is this intimacy, flowing forth as the feelings (from all over the place, remembering the likely 'chaos' of Kristeva's 'chora'...) for and belief about the inextricable ties between immersion in the 'lives' of specific materials and the desire to make-for-art, that generates and supports the emergent conviction that such a making-attempt cannot be avoided. Immersion in the mattering of materials, *in the question of 'how' they, and thus performing itself, matter*, marks performing as the crisis-ridden (for it can never know whether it will make, achieve, the leap out) tension of a double act: in the transliterative process of converting its materials into some 'thing' whose singularity might just mark out art's difference, it has to retain and show its materials in and as the primacy of their sensuous materiality, to show that it is they too, *always partially independently of performing*, that art's difference rests upon.

It is right there that performing seeks to site itself. It has to learn ways of surviving within the strange intensity of the tension of this becoming-in-between. For it, this is where the only chance and hope for art's difference can be sustained. And, however dependent it is upon the guiding leaps of its thoughtfulness, this 'position', this no-where-drifting (thus recalling Josephine's 'nothing' voice...), has nothing whatsoever to do with the encompassing machinery of response, of the analysing, historicising, criticising-evaluating discourses that are gathered together under 'aesthetics'. Performing may dive into and out of these knowledge-sites according to particular projects' circumstantial requirements; indeed it may be very 'knowledgable' about some of them, but, precisely in its driven attachment to the leap through the co-gathering materials, *it severs itself from all the conceptual concerns of aesthetics*. Its serendipitous dipping into and out of 'aesthetics' (or any other knowledge zone) has nothing whatsoever to do with any theoretical-conceptual knowledge-project (all performing-for-art is cata-conceptual.... for performers either there never was any 'conceptual art' or all art is concept-suffused but only cata-conceptually!). It 'knows' absolutely (whatever subterfuge it may employ to survive in 'calculative' culture by passing itself off as, for example, 'research' or 'experiment'...) that it is not performing knowledge-production in the way the culture 'understands' knowledge (as instrumentally applicable empirically derived discourse-specific concepts - as practical-theorising). In this severing it releases itself from all the concerns of the encompassing discourses. *The 'how' of its surfacing is intended precisely to effect a dissociation between itself and everything else, to make itself an exception.* It offers itself as the possibility (however faint and slight) of art's difference. Consequently, performing, absorbed by the art-full possibilities of its materials, is constitutionally uninterested in placing itself, or being placed by others, in relation to the placing-evaluating categories that lead response, under the jurisdictional authority of 'aesthetics', to its judgments.

In thus trying to live out its 'life' in the in-between of its intimate attachments (its co-gathering material specificities) it thus separates itself absolutely from mimesis, analogy, coherence, and all the conventions developed in the surrounding culture for working out the relation between a representer and a represented. Indeed, if we recognise that performing's leap is always the performing of a question, a questioning addressed to itself about its own possibilities and the qualities of their desire to make-for-art through its seducing materials, this in itself is enough to excise any ties to representation. For, as a performative, such questioning places itself aside from all comparing resembling relations (mimesis and so on). Such questioning does not live in a comparative relation to some preceding past-present outside itself; it cannot be measured for

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[15]  The implications of this 'more' for different zones of performing's relation to its material co-gathering (the conventional 'medium' or 'media') is explored in the texts following this one.

'likeness' to a motif.  Performing, in and  as the self-questioning leap, effects a caesura between itself and representation. In this movement it removes itself from the applicability of the latter's assessment criteria.

It is this differentiation that elides it, brings it into a tangential relation, however passing and brief, with techno-science's digitising of the means of communication, of all the conventional modes of representing. Coming from utterly different 'origins' and making for irreconcilably different destinations, *they nevertheless share,in their emergence,  their separation from the rule of representation*.  In their defining activities both  making-for-art and  digitised-info-transmission sever themselves from the constitution of representation as a relation motivated by and grounding itself in assumed  'natural' and/or 'logical' forms of connection (invariably implying some kind of relative determination) that tie a representer to the represented for which it substitutes.  In effect, their transforming processes are there to celebrate the radicality of the separation that they achieve. For this is what they disclose about their sourcing, about what their procedures display about the difference of their beginnings, beginnings that differentiate them both from each other and from the culture which seems to enfold them but which they also help to shape. And of course their trajectories away from these sourcings seek to carry them to utterly different, but still absolutely distant, destinations: making-for-art makes towards the moving, the becoming-trembling, not-yet of art's beyond, while digitised transmission heads away to the not-yet of calculation's other world  -  that virtual 'site' outside and overseeing the world we inhabit, from within which it hopes to institute its (impossible...) fusion of conceptual and instrumental control, its  mastery (on all our behalfs, as our self-appointed 'representative'...) over the earth as a standing reserve of matter and mattering-as-power. Each on its separate way out,  passing, they touch tangentially at the 'point' of their different self-excisions from representation. And what seems to prevent any coming-together, any possibility of merging or fusion at this passing point of tangential  contact, is what they owe to and seek to preserve from their different sourcings. Art wants nothing of representation, whereas digitisation wants to represent everything through the purity of a simulation whose arbitrary coding excises all 'direct' relating to its matters (the 'things' over there which it re-codes as 'objects of knowledge').

What moves making-for-art from its sourcing is the hope of  finding ways of disclosing the dependent intimacy of this source through immersion in, giving oneself over to, the specific materials constituting the sourcing's irrecusable attraction. Its gests seek to memorialise (hence the gest's 'ceremonialising' noted by Deleuze) this intimacy through finding ways of preserving it, of providing access to it for others. The out-foldings offered in the surfaces of its gests hope to withdraw willing respondents from their cultural binds and draw them 'down' into the sourcing's  inmost through sharing something (material remnants) of the journey-out-and-back ( *anabasis ...* meridian) undergone by the  performer. As the 'point' of  performing's charge is the constitution of a singularity, a figuring-out whose idiosyncrasy differentiates it from all other gests while placing itself under the conjectured 'an-authority' (powerlessness...) of art, it sets itself aside from representation from the beginning. For neither the movement of its figuring-out, its sequenced registering of marks (its para-(syn)taxis), nor the elements constituting this registering (its surfaces), follow any rule for fixing the relation between a representer and a represented.

Thus the gest resulting from performing's movement is itself the congealing of a one-off almost-language *without some knowable, separately articulable, preceding past-present to which it refers and against which its performance can be measured for matching power (mimesis, analogy ... and so forth)*. The only 'referring' it is doing is thus to the performer's idiosyncratic collection of others' art-gests, an invariably loose, unboundaried and ever-changing assembly,

gathered  from all over the place (and time), with which she/he feels the deepest affinity. This is the open-ended collection toward which each gest is cast in performing's leap away. If this attempt to display the intimacy of affinity is taken as a kind of referring then it has nothing to do with, and certainly does not make any claim about, itself as some kind of 'representative' of this distant collection. Quite aside from representation, it is performing a strange mix of homage, obeisance (to the collection's powerless 'authority'), desire, and a certain hubris-in-doubt (its posing of its gest as an open question about its committed hope for and belief in the outside possibility of its own eventual co-option to the collection).

By this leap away from representing and referring (apart from the above possible exception) it places its faith in, takes its chances with, the possibility that its almost-language might just effect a breakdown in the ability of the surrounding languages' methods  (under calculation's sway) to reconcile it with their own placing-evaluating procedures, to absorb it without remainder in their knowledge-fixing conventions. *In its transliteration of its unfigurable sourcing it has aways already abandoned representation.*  And now, itself surrounded everywhere and penetrated by the electronic and social machinery that effects digitisation's rule, it finds that it can only survive through its ambiguous, *and thus tense*, participation in this machinery. For, while the info-spectacle's digitisation processes procede, like performing itself, through the suspension of representation, its entire machinery operates to maintain the illusion of representation even as it sheers off into virtuality and simulation. Faced by this maintenance, making-for-art,  irrespective of its internal differentiation according to performers' medium-intimacies,  cannot but struggle to live on in relations of extreme tension to its machined circumstances. For the public (social, cultural, political, economic, aesthetic, religious, or whatever dimensions) life of performing and its gests, how they 'appear' and circulate, how they are 'culturally housed', is organised through continuously monitored and assessed processes of reproduction that are themselves now dependent upon electronically digitised reproduction. The routine operation of this machinery becomes the arts' representative, normalises their appearance, and fixes them definitively within culture's everyday life as representatives of some vague cultural 'good' (for example, as exemplars of some non-specific 'creativity').